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ORIGINALISM AS JUJITSU 
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE "SILENT" 
NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON'T KNOW 
THEY HAVE. By Daniel A. Farber. 1 New York: Basic 
Books, 2007. Pp. xiv + 236. $26.95. 
Kurt T. Lash2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jujitsu: 
The art of using an opponents· energy against them 
The Ninth Amendmene presents an irresistible mystery. It 
speaks of "other rights" retained by the people and it prohibits 
interpretations which "deny or disparage" those rights. The 
Amendment, however, tells us nothing about what these rights 
are or how they can be enforced. On the one hand, this makes 
the Ninth rather difficult to apply. On the other hand, the lack of 
definitional clarity also makes the Ninth Amendment something 
of a desideratum for those seeking expanded judicial protection 
of previously unrecognized individual rights. Accordingly. the 
Ninth Amendment has been cited in support of everything from 
Dial-a-Porn~ to freedom from second hand smoke.' 
The Supreme Court has generally shied away from discuss-
ing, much less relying upon, the Ninth Amendment. It has been 
left to legal academics to try and convince judges that the 
1. Sho Sato Professor of Law. University of California-Berkeley School of Law. 
2. James P. Bradley Professor of Constitutional Law. Loyola Law School. 
3. "'The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people ... U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
4. PAUL R. ABRAMSON. STEVEN D. PINKERTON & MARK HUPPIN. SEXCAL 
RIGHTS IN AMERICA: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE PURSCIT OF HAPPINESS 
(2003). 
5. See Gasper v. La. Stadium & Exposition Dist.. 4111 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976). 
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Amendment can be explained and applied in a principled man-
ner. To date, the effort has been no more than sporadically suc-
cessful. The Supreme Court, for example, has generally ignored 
the Ninth Amendment the last quarter century." Judicial en-
forcement of unenumerated rights, however, has continued un-
abated in one form or another ever since the modern Supreme 
Court initiated its privacy jurisprudence in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut. 
7 The right to privacy, for example, has expanded from pro-
tecting the right to contraception, to guaranteeing the right to 
abortion" and. most recently, guarding the right to sexual auton-
omy in Lawrence v. Texas. 9 Although Justice Kennedy's lead 
opinion in Lawrence did not expressly declare that sexual au-
tonomy was a fundamental right, he nevertheless couched his 
opinion in language traditionally associated with the Court's 
heightened scrutiny for freedoms which should be beyond the 
reach of political majorities. 10 In one of the more controversial 
aspects of his opinion, Justice Kennedy looked to international 
law to support his conclusion that laws imposing particular bur-
dens on homosexuals were constitutionally suspect. 11 Kennedy's 
reliance on foreign legal sources ignited a firestorm of criticism 
from the right and an on-going debate regarding the legitimacy 
of relying on foreign law in interpreting the American Constitu-
. I' tlon.-
6. The last Supreme Court opinion (in the majority) to invoke the Ninth Amend-
ment as an enforceable provision was the plurality opinion by Justice Burger in Rich-
mond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia. 448 U.S. 555. 579 (1980). The plurality in Casey came 
close. but ultimately affirmed the right to obtain an abortion on the basis of stare decisis. 
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833. 848 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). Cf. Troxel v. Granville. 530 U.S. 57. 91-92 (2000) (Scalia. J. dissenting) (de-
scribing parental rights as parts of the "other rights" referred to in the Ninth Amend-
ment but claiming the clause is not judicially enforceable). 
7. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
8. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
9. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
10. See, e.g., Lawrence. 539 U.S. at 578 ("Their right to liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention 
of the government. ""It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal 
liberty which the government may not enter. "'[citing Casey]). 
11. Lawrence.539 U.S. at 576-77 (citing decisions by the European Court of Human 
Rights and amicus briefs discussing international protection of homosexuality). 
12. For the political response to judicial use of foreign sources. see American Jus-
tice for Americans Citizens Act. H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (forbidding federal 
courts from interpreting the Constitution by employing contemporary foreign or interna-
tional legal authorities not relied upon by the Framers): Constitution Restoration Act of 
2004. S. 2323. 108th Cong. § 201 (2004) ("In interpreting and applying the Constitu-
tion ... a court ... may not rely upon any ... law ... of any foreign state or international 
organization or agency. other than English constitutional and common law."): H.R. Res. 
568. 108th Cong. (2004) ( "[J]udicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of 
the United States should not be based in whole or in part on judgments. laws. or pro-
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Enter Daniel Farber. In his new book, Retained by the 
People: The "Silent" Ninth Amendment and the Constitutional 
Rights Americans Don't Know They Have, Farber claims that 
conservatives are wrong to criticize either the result or the rea-
soning in Lawrence. According to Farber, the Founders them-
selves framed the Ninth Amendment with the understanding 
that courts would look beyond the borders of the United States 
in determining the nature of the people's retained fundamental 
rights. Although not an originalist himself (Farber has criticized 
the approach in prior works13), Farber uses originalism in order 
to illustrate what he believes is the hypocritical refusal of con-
servatives to apply their purported commitment to text and his-
tory when it comes to the Ninth Amendment. As Farber ex-
claims, if conservatives do not like his call to consider the norms 
of international law, don't blame him, "blame the Framers!" (p. 
90). 
Using originalism against (conservative) originalists is noth-
ing new. 14 This kind of argumentative jujitsu, however, is a risky 
endeavor. Non-practitioners who use originalist methodology 
may not be familiar with the most sophisticated (and defensible) 
forms of original~sm. But eve~ _if perfe~tly ~pplie~, ori_ginalism is 
a dangerous chmce for a pohtical partisan. · A htstoncal record 
which supports your preferred outcome today may well expand 
in a manner that undermines your argument tomorrow. Worse, 
having yourself validated the use of history in constitutional in-
terpretation, the inevitable counter-move will be all the more ef-
fective. 
nouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments. laws. or pronounce-
ments ... inform an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United 
States."). 
13. See, e.g .. DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY. DESPERATELY SEEKING 
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). 
14. Examples abound. from Bruce Ackerman's series. WE THE PEOPLE: 
FOUNDATIONS (1993). WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000). to Jack Balkin. 
Abortion and Original Meaning. 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007). 
15. Farber's book has rather obvious partisan goals. From the opening pages of his 
book. and throughout the work. Farber makes clear that "conservatives" are the particu-
lar target of his analysis. Just a few examples: The Ninth Amendment is "reviled bv 
some-especially on the conservative end of the spectrum" (p. 1). There is a "conservi-
tive flight from the ninth amendment" (p. 3). "It is conservatives who should fear and 
deny the Ninth-and many do" (p. 3). "For all their talk about fidelity to the constitu-
tion. however. [conservatives) prefer to ignore inconvenient parts of it'' (p. 3). "Since 
many conservatives do not want to hear its message. they pretend it does not exist" (p. 
4). The usual conservative suspects. Justice Antonio Scalia and Judge Robert Bork are 
singled out as among the worst offenders when it comes to misconstruing the Ninth 
Amendment (p. 5). 
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Also in the category of '"be careful what you wish for," Far-
ber's insists that the Ninth Amendment should be read in light 
of the Founders' embrace of the "law of nations" and the writing 
of early internationalists like Emmerich de Vattel (pp. 6-9). 
Here, Farber is more correct than he knows. Members of the 
Founding generation did rely on Vattel in their understanding of 
the Ninth Amendment, but their use of the law of nations points 
in the opposite direction of what Farber proposes. International-
ists like Vattel were particularly concerned about preserving the 
retained rights of sovereign nations. A sovereign might need to 
delegate away some of its sovereign prerogatives (in a treaty, for 
example), but such delegations were to be strictly construed, 
with the sovereign retaining all rights not clearly delegated away. 
The Founders shared this understanding of the retained rights of 
sovereignty and insisted that the law of nations called for a nar-
row construction of delegated federal power. u> In the first consti-
tutional treatise, St. George Tucker expressly read the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments in light of Vattel's law of nations rule re-
garding the strict construction of delegated power. International 
law thus informed the Founders' original understanding of the 
Ninth Amendment as limiting federal power to intrude upon 
powers and rights left to sovereign control of the people in the 
states. This is the opposite of Farber's assumption that the origi-
nal understanding of the Ninth Amendment supports federal 
imposition of unenumerated human rights on dissenting state 
majorities. 
After briefly sketching Farber's approach to the historical 
Ninth Amendment, I will consider Farber's work in the context 
of contemporary debates regarding originalism and the Ninth 
Amendment. Moving to particular historical issues. I then ana-
lyze Farber's claims in light of a newly expanded historical 
record. 
II. THE BOOK 
Farber divides his book into roughly two halves. The first 
half explores the history of the Ninth Amendment. The second 
presents Farber's theory of judicial protection of individual 
rights and the methods by which courts can enforce these rights 
without reproducing the sin of Lochner, or imposing subjective 
judicial preferences on the rest of the country. 
16. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
2009] BOOK REVIEWS 525 
With the exception of his discussion of international human 
rights, Farber's story of the Ninth Amendment tracks what until 
recently has been a rough scholarly consensus regarding the 
Ninth since Griswold v. Connecticut. 17 According to this tradi-
tional view, Federalists like James Wilson (in his famous State 
House Speech1s) and James Madison insisted that adding a Bill 
of Rights might be understood to imply that all non-enumerated 
rights had been "assigned" into the hands of the national gov-
ernment.19 Although eventually pressed into adopting a Bill of 
Rights, Madison proposed the Ninth Amendment in order to 
prevent any erroneous assumptions about the existence of "'oth-
er rights" beyond those listed in the Bill. 20 According to Farber, 
these "other rights'' were fundamental natural rights "embedded 
in the law of nations" (pp. 24-25). Although the Ninth Amend-
ment originally applied against the federal government, the same 
set of individual natural rights apply against the states by way of 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause 
(p. 16). 
Farber devotes the second half of his book to explaining 
how the historical understanding of the Ninth Amendment can 
be put into principled operation by the courts. Abandoning the 
originalist methodology of the first half. Farber advocates a 
"pragmatic" approach to judicial review and sets out a number 
of factors that courts can follow in deciding whether to recognize 
a new fundamental right (p. 108). Applying his theory to a num-
17. 381 U.S.479(1965). 
18. See James Wilson. State House Speech (Oct. 6. 1787). in 1 THE FOL':'<DERs· 
CONSTITUTION 449 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds .. 1987). 
19. James Madison. Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments 
(June 8. 1789). in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 448-49 (Jack Rakove ed .. 1999) [hereinaf-
ter WRITINGS]. As James Iredell declared in the North Carolina ratifying convention: 
[I]t would be not only useless. but dangerous. to enumerate a number of rights 
which are not intended to be given up: because it would be implying. in the 
strongest manner. that every right not included in the exception might be im-
paired by the government without usurpation: and it would be impossible to 
enumerate every one. Let anyone make what collection or enumeration of 
rights he pleases. I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not 
contained in it. 
Remarks of James Iredell in the North Carolina Ratifving Convention (July 29. 1788). in 4 
THE DEBATE IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 0:'-1 THE ADOPTIO:o-; OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GESERAL CONVE!'iTIOS AT 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787. at 167 (Jonathan Elliot ed .. 2d ed .. J.B. Lippincott Co. 1941) 
(1836) [hereinafter. THE DEBATE]. For a general discussion of these arguments bv Wil-
son. Madison. and Iredell. see KCRT T. LASH. THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NISTH 
AMENDMENT 14. n.4 (2009). 
20. James Madison. Speech on Proposed Constitutional Amendments (1789). in 
WRITINGS supra note 19. at 448-49. 
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ber of contemporary controversies, Farber concludes that much 
of the modern Supreme Court's substantive due process juri-
sprudence is justified, though he would expand the list of fun-
damental rights to include a positive right to education and gov-
ernment protection from private harm. Farber closes his book 
with a short "Appendix'' that briefly presents alternate views of 
the Ninth Amendment and explains why they fail to do full jus-
tice to the original understanding of the text (p. 201 ). 
Throughout the book, Farber employs a straight-forward 
and easily accessible narrative that is unencumbered by copious 
footnotes or detailed analysis of historical documents. Indeed, 
Farber expressly declines to engage the historical debate, insist-
ing instead that he has presented "the best interpretation of his-
tory" (p. 5). This approach has the benefit of making the work 
far more accessible to a lay audience unfamiliar with this par-
ticular area of law (or indeed of constitutional law in general). 
Had Faber attempted to simply summarize a commonly held 
view of the Ninth Amendment. his light approach might have 
been appropriate. But Farber has a more ambitious agenda. He 
seeks to both discredit what he calls "conservative" readings of 
the Ninth Amendment and establish a textual and historical ba-
sis for judicial enforcement of international human rights. Given 
the current level of debate regarding the Ninth, neither of Far-
ber's goals can be reached without a close engagement of an ex-
panded (and expanding) corpus of historical materials. 
III. ORIGINALISM AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT 
In the 1980s. conservatives hitched their wagons to the in-
terpretive theory of original intent in response to what they 
viewed as the excesses of the Warren and Burger Courts. Bran-
dishing terms like "strict construction'' and "judicial restraint," 
figures like Edwin Meese and Robert Bork called for a return to 
the original intentions of the Framers.21 The idea that the Consti-
tution should reflect the intentions of the Founders had substan-
tial rhetorical appeal, particularly for conservatives who were 
fairly sure that the Framers did not envision reproductive rights 
and sexual autonomy. Restoring the "original intent of the fra-
mers" thus became a kind of call to arms for conservative scho-
lars and politicians alike. 
21. See generally ROBERT BORK. THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDCCTION OF THE LAW (1990). 
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The call did not go unchallenged. Defenders of the Supreme 
Court's privacy jurisprudence called into question the very idea 
of discovering any "original intent." The assault came from two 
directions: First, legal theorists argued that determining a single 
"intent" was impossible.22 Secondly, historians like H. Jefferson 
Powell argued that the framers themselves rejected the concept 
of using their intentions as a guide to constitutional meaning. 21 
Although these critics were successful in terms of discrediting 
the search for framers' intent, the ultimate result of their efforts 
was to force originalists into rethinking both the methodology 
and normative justification for an historical approach to consti-
tutional interpretation.24 Today, most originalists have moved 
away from instrumentalist justifications like "judicial restraint," 
and instead tend to ground the originalist enterprise on the nor-
mative theory of popular sovereignty.25 Instead of seeking origi-
nal intent, most originalists today seek the likely public meaning 
of the text as understood by those with the sovereign right to al-
ter or amend the Constitution- the ratifiers. The search for orig-
inal understanding or "original meaning" avoids many of the 
theoretical pitfalls of the earlier search for original intent while 
at the same time placing the entire enterprise on firmer norma-
tive ground. 
A more successful attack on the conservative originalism of 
the 1980s came from a group of scholars who adopted the me-
thods of originalism and deployed them against conservative 
theories of constitutional meaning. Yale professor Bruce Ack-
erman, for example, discovered the foundations of modern lib-
eral government in the public debates and constitutional com-
mitments of the Founding generation. 2" Ackerman challenged 
the conservative idea that judicial enforcement of individual li-
berties presented a "counter-majoritarian difficulty" which 
called for the exercise of judicial restraint. 27 According to Ack-
22. See Paul Brest. The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding. 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204 (1980). 
23. H. Jefferson Powell. The Original Understanding of Original Intent. 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 885 (1985). 
24. See ANTONIN SCALIA. A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1998): KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING. ORIGINAL 
INTE:'-IT. AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001 ). 
25. See, e.g. WHITTINGTON. supra note 24. 
26. See ACKERMAN. supra note 14: AKHIL REED AMAR. THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
(1998). 
27. Compare ALEXANDER BICKEL. THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1986) 
(presenting the counter-majoritarian difficulty) with ACKERMAN. supra note 14 (persua-
sively resolving the same). 
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erman, the Founders established a dualist system of government 
in which the sovereign people enshrined their supermajoritarian 
will in a written Constitution (higher law), which courts then en-
forced against the majoritarian political process (ordinary law). 
Far from being counter-majoritarian, judicial review under such 
a system vindicated the people's sovereign authority to establish 
their own fundamental law. 
By using their own historical commitments against them, 
liberal legal theorists were able to place conservative critics of 
'"judicial activism" on the defensive. One of the biggest conserv-
ative complaints had been judicial recognition of the right to pri-
vacy. Their argument was (and remains) the fact that the right is 
nowhere mentioned in the text of the Constitution. In response, 
liberal scholars cited the Ninth Amendment, a text that seemed 
to clearly vindicate the unenumerated rights approach of the Su-
preme Court in cases like Griswold and Roe v. Wade. Instead of 
producing a counter-historical narrative regarding the original 
understanding of the Ninth. however, conservative legal thinkers 
had literally nothing to say. In one of the most famous exchanges 
in modern American constitutional law, Judge Robert Bork, one 
of the top constitutional theorists of his generation. testified to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee that he could no more find 
meaning in the Ninth Amendment than he could in a text ob-
scured '"by an inkblot." To his critics, Bork's refusal to find 
meaning in the Ninth seemed to illustrate conservative hypocrisy 
when it came to their purported commitment to the original un-
derstanding of the Constitution- a criticism Farber repeats 
throughout his book. 
In defense of Judge Bork, however. at the time that he testi-
fied before the Senate no one knew much about the Ninth 
Amendment. As an originalist, Bork was committed to remain-
ing agnostic about the meaning of a text until such time that suf-
ficient historical evidence is uncovered to allow at least some 
tentative conclusions about its original meaning. Since Bork's 
testimony, however, a great deal of historical and theoretical 
work has taken place in regard to the Ninth. As a result, we are 
in a much better position today than Bork was to assess the most 
likely original understanding of the text. 
THE EVOLVING DEBATE ON THE HISTORICAL NINTH 
The first wave of scholarly commentary on Ninth focused 
on its text, not its history. This is not surprising given the as-
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sumed lack of any such history and, besides. there seemed little 
reason to investigate the amendment's original understanding 
given the seemingly facial declaration of the Ninth that there 
were other individual rights beyond those listed in the text. The 
insistence by some scholars that the Ninth merely restated prin-
ciples declared by the Tenth seemed implausible, given the 
Tenth's focus on state powers and the Ninth's focus on the 
people's rights. The Supreme Court. however. proved unwilling 
to develop a specific Ninth Amendment jurisprudence. For 
years, then. a stalemate existed between liberal scholars who in-
sisted that the Ninth had meaning (but weren't exactly sure what 
it was) and conservatives who supported judicial non-
enforcement (perhaps hoping the issue would just go away). As 
a result, historical analysis of the Ninth Amendment remained 
moribund and the Supreme Court turned to other constitutional 
provisions in support of substantive due process rights. 
It was not until the last decade the twentieth century that 
serious discussion of the historical Ninth Amendment reap-
peared. In a series of essays and, later. a full book, libertarian 
scholar Randy Barnett solved the problem of liberal application 
of the Ninth by reversing the burden of proof. Rather than re-
quiring a party to prove a retained right exists, Barnett read the 
Ninth as requiring the government to prove power exists in situ-
ations impinging upon a broad class of individual liberties. Com-
bining the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment produced what 
Barnett calls. '"a !?resumption of liberty" against both federal and 
state regulatwn.-
Barnett's work not only provided an escape from the Ninth 
Amendment's black box of '"other rights." he supported his 
reading of the Ninth with a close investigation of the historical 
record surrounding the drafting and adoption of the Amend-
ment. Taking advantage of theoretical advances in originalist 
theory, Barnett embraced "original meaning" originalism and 
claimed that the Amendment would have been broadly unders-
tood as a rule calling for narrow construction of federal power. 
In a critical contribution to historical scholarship on the Ninth 
Amendment, Barnett focused on James Madison's speech 
against the Bank of the United States, in which Madison ex-
pressly declared that the Ninth was meant to operate as rule 
28. RANDY E. BARNETT. RESTORI:-;G THE LOST CONSTITCTI0:\1: THE 
PRESCMPTION OF LIBERTY (2003). 
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prohibiting any undue "latitude of interpretation" in regard to 
federal authority.''~ 
Barnett's work advanced the understanding of the historical 
Ninth Amendment in a number of ways. First, Barnett estab-
lished that the Ninth Amendment was understood by at least 
some Founders as an active constraint on the interpretation of 
federal power. Some scholars had claimed that the Ninth was no 
more than a kind of restatement of the Tenth-with neither 
amendment representing anything more than a passive state-
ment that all non-delegated powers remained to the states. By 
highlighting Madison's speech, Barnett was able to persuasively 
argue that Founders like James Madison saw the Ninth as an en-
forceable rule of construction which actively constrained the in-
terpretation of Congress' enumerated powers. 
In one significant regard, however, Barnett agreed with 
prior commentary on the Ninth that the Amendment had gone 
unnoticed in any significant manner prior to the Supreme 
Court's 1965 decision in Griswold. Even as late as 2003, every 
published work on the Ninth continued to insist that the 
Amendment had languished in obscurity from 1791 to 1965. The 
problem was, every serious Ninth Amendment scholar knew this 
was not entirely true. Legal historians had long noted a curious 
body of case law, primarily from the nineteenth century, which 
cited the Ninth Amendment as working alongside the Tenth to 
prevent federal encroachment upon matters believed best left to 
state control. This is not a small group of judicial outliers- there 
are literally hundreds of such cases extending from the earliest 
decades of the Constitution to the time of the New Deal. By in-
sisting that the Ninth had languished in obscurity, most scholars 
simply dismissed these early cases as "mistakes." Everyone 
knows. they insisted, that the Tenth Amendment guards state 
rights and the Ninth protects the rights of the people. Thus, an 
entire body of case law linking the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments was dismissed, leaving the Ninth to seem as if it appeared 
"out of nowhere" in 1965. 
But just as the troubling existence of retrograde motion 
eventually forced a rethinking of the Ptolemaic universe, so it 
was inevitable that scholars would eventually be forced to revisit 
this seemingly anomalous body of case law and, perhaps, rethink 
the conventional wisdom regarding the Ninth Amendment. The 
29. See BARNETI. supra note 28. at 163. See also. James Madison. Speech Opposing 
the Bank of the United States ( 1791 ). in WRITINGS. supra note 19. at 480. 
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latest wave of Ninth Amendment scholarship takes a second 
look at the historical association of the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments and argues that courts were not wrong to pair the 
amendments for more than one hundred years. Plumbing the 
depths of this new debate about the Ninth is beyond the scope of 
this particular review. Some of the more recent entries can be 
found in a recent volume of the Stanford Law Review where 
Randy Barnett and I debate the relative merits of the libertarian 
and federalist readings of the historical Ninth Amendment."' For 
the purposes of this review, I will only highlight where the cur-
rent evidence undermines a number of Farber's (and most mod-
ern scholars') assumptions about the Ninth. More time will be 
spent on one of Farber's distinctive claims regarding the Ninth 
Amendment and international law. 
NINTH AMENDMENT MYTHOLOGY AND THE HISTORICAL 
RECORD 
Here, in a nutshell, are Farber's claims about the historical 
Ninth Amendment: (1) Unlike the rest of the Bill of Rights 
which reflected Anti-Federalist concerns about limiting federal 
power, the Ninth Amendment reflected Federalist concerns 
about protecting individual rights. (2) Language which was de-
leted from Madison's original draft of the Ninth proves that the 
Founders intended the Amendment to protect individual rights, 
as opposed to the Tenth Amendment which the Founders in-
tended to limit federal power to interfere with matters left to the 
states. (3) The Ninth Amendment languished in obscurity prior 
to Griswold v. Connecticut. None of these assertions are particu-
larly unique. Indeed, they reflect what until very recently has 
been the consensus view among legal scholars. Nevertheless, the 
complete historical record calls into question every one of these 
commonly accepted propositions. 
THE NINTH AND THE CONCERNS OF THE STATE CONVENTIONS 
One of Farber's goals is to establish a clear distinction be-
tween the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in terms of their un-
derlying principles and goals. The Ninth is about individual 
30. See Randy E. Barnett. Kurt Lash's Majoritarian Dif(icultv: A Response to a Tex-
lliai-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment. 60 STAt-;. L. REV. 937 (2001-l): Kurt T. 
Lash. On Federalism, Freedom, and the Founders' View of Retained Rights: A Reply to 
Randy Barnell, 60 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2008) See also. LASH. THE LOST HISTORY OF THE 
NINTH AMENDMENT. supra note 19. 
532 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 25:521 
rights, while the Tenth is about limiting federal power. Distin-
guishing the Ninth from the states' rights oriented Tenth is im-
portant in light of Farber's ultimate conclusion that the Ninth 
represents principles that can be applied against the states. Far-
ber makes two basic arguments in his attempt to drive a wedge 
between the two amendments. First, he claims that the Ninth 
emerged out of Federalist concerns about individual rights (p. 
37), not Anti-Federalist concerns about limiting federal power. 
Second, Farber argues that Madison's original intent to place the 
clauses in different sections of the Constitution illustrates how 
the Amendments had different purposes and goals. 
Farber's first claim is that "the Ninth Amendment was the 
product of Madison's mind" (p. 209). Other scholars have made 
similar claims. Leonard Levy, for example, asserts that unlike 
the rest of the Bill of Rights which are rooted in proposals made 
by the state ratifying conventions, the language of the Ninth 
Amendment was the unique idea of James Madison alone.31 
While this is true of the final language of the Ninth, Madison's 
original proposal echoed language suggested by a number of 
state conventions. Virginia's proposed amendments in particular 
(which Madison helped draft).32 Madison's original draft of the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendment also both addressed the same 
general subject: The need to limit federal power. Here are Madi-
son's original drafts of both Amendments: 
The exceptions, here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made 
in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to 
diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the 
people. or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitu-
tion; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as in-
serted merely for greater caution." 
The powers not delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively. 3~ 
Madison's Tenth has the effect of limiting the federal govern-
ment to delegated powers (unlike the general police powers of 
the states). The Ninth forbids undue "enlargement" of those de-
31. See. e.g .. LEONARD W. LEVY. ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 247 (1999) 
(Madison "improvised (the Ninth Amendment]. No precise precedent for it existed."). 
32. Scholars have long noticed the link between Madison's original draft and pro-
posals from Virginia and New York. For a discussion of these proposals. see Kurt T. 
Lash. The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment. 93 IOWA L. REV. 801(2008). 
33. Madison. supra note 19. at 443. 
34. !d. at 444. 
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legated powers. The original draft of the Amendments thus ad-
dressed the same general goal, limiting national power. This not 
only links the original purposes of the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, it also ties them to the concerns of the state con-
ventions. Limiting federal power, of course, was more of a con-
cern to the doubters in the state conventions than the Federalist 
proponents of the Constitution. 
Farber's second claim involves Madison's original intended 
placement of the two amendments. Madison had originally pro-
posed placing the Ninth Amendment with the other amend-
ments addressing individual rights, while placing the Tenth in 
Article VI. Farber believes that Madison's intended separation 
of the two amendments indicates the clauses originally had dif-
ferent purposes: The Tenth was about federalism while the 
Ninth "was about individual rights" (p. 44)." 
Here Farber makes an assumption about Madison's intent 
based on his original planned placement of the amendments. But 
there is no need in this case to try and guess Madison's views 
about the relationship between the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments." The man is on record as declaring, in both private letters 
and public speeches, that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
worked together to protect the reserved powers and rights of the 
states.1" Farber does not mention Madison's explanations, both 
delivered while ratification of the Bill of Rights remained pend-
ing in the states. It is possible that Farber follows some histo-
rians in distinguishing between the "early" and "later" views of 
Madison, with the former taking a more nationalist view of fed-
eral power and rights and the latter taking more of a (post hoc) 
states rights approach in response to the nationalist policies of 
Alexander Hamilton and John Adams.17 This bifurcated view of 
Madison generally attempts to distinguish the Madison who fa-
thered the Constitution with the Madison who later advocated a 
rule of strict construction of federal power. Modern biographers 
of Madison, however, stress the remarkable consistency in Madi-
35. The Founders do not seem to have shared Farber's clean distinction between 
limiting federal power (federalism) and protecting individual rights. For example. James 
Madison claimed that the Sedition Act violated both individual rights and the rights of 
states. See generally. Kurt T. Lash. James Madison ·s Celebrated report of 1800: The 
Transformation of the Tenth Amendment. 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165. 181 (2006). 
36. See Madison. supra note 29. 
37. There are places in Farber's book where he appears to take this ··earlv v. late·· 
view of Madison's work. (e.g .. p. 46: "In their reaction against Hamilton and the. Federal-
ist Part's platform. Southerners like Jefferson and Madison developed a constitutional 
theory that stressed states· rights and strict construction of federal power."). 
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son's thinking from the end of the Philadelphia Convention 
through his 1790s battles with the nationalist policies of men like 
Alexander Hamilton.3x Indeed, Madison adopted a mixed view 
of the Constitution (both federal and national) throughout his 
life, for he fought as hard against ultranationalists like Hamilton 
as he did against ultra-states' rights theorists like Spencer Roane 
and John C. Calhoun.39 
But even accepting the theory of the "two Madison's," one 
still cannot dismiss his declarations regarding the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments. Madison's Virginia Resolutions were in-
deed a response to the aggressive nationalist policies of the Fe-
deralist Party, and they were written a decade after the adoption 
of the Constitution. But Madison's declarations regarding the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendment were written in 1791, even before 
the adoption of the Bill of Rights. In short, not only do we know 
Madison's views of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, he de-
clared those views, more than once, before the ink on the origi-
nal Constitution was dry. 
Putting aside for the moment the issue of Madison's per-
sonal intentions, by stressing the original proposed placement of 
the two amendments, Farber relies on an outmoded form of ori-
ginalism. At most, Madison's placement proposal might tell us 
something of Madison's original private intentions regarding the 
two provisions. Contemporary originalists, however, do not seek 
the private intentions of the Framers. Instead, the effort is tore-
cover the original public meaning of the text as it was unders-
tood by the ratifiers, the body with the sovereign authority to es-
tablish fundamental law. This shift in methodology reflects a 
shift in the normative justification for using original meaning as 
an interpretive method. Although presented in the past as a tool 
for constraining judicial activism, today the practitioners of ori-
ginalism most often justify their efforts on the normative theory 
of popular sovereignty- the sovereign right of the people to es-
tablish fundamental law in a written and enforceable Constitu-
tion.~() The relevant group in this endeavor is not the individual 
framers (and their private intentions), but the members of the 
ratifying assemblies who debated and adopted the text. This 
3R See, e.g .. RALPH KETCHAM. JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 323 (1990). 
39. Farber himself has discussed the "mixed" position of Madison regarding state 
and national power in other works. See DANIEL FARBER. LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 39 
(2003) [hereinafter FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION]. 
40. For the sophisticated (and complete) analysis of popular sovereignty based ori-
ginalism. see WHITTINGTON. supra note 24. 
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group would not have known about Madison's original place-
ment of the two amendments. Instead, they were presented with 
a single "Bill," with the Ninth and Tenth Amendments placed 
side by side. 
THE ALTERED LANGUAGE 
Two critical changes occurred between the time Madison 
presented his proposed amendments and when Congress pre-
sented the Bill of Rights to the states. First, as discussed above, 
the Amendments were consolidated into a single Bill to be add-
ed at the end of the original Constitution. Secondly, Madison's 
original language regarding the Ninth was trimmed. The final 
draft of the Ninth omitted the original language regarding feder-
al power and focused solely on the issue of the retained rights of 
the people. Farber claims that this alteration proves that the final 
draft addressed only individual rights and had nothing to do with 
limiting federal power.41 This is a common claim among those 
who read the amendment as only protecting individual rights. 
From a modern perspective, this assertion seems reasonable 
enough -language referring to the rights of the people seems 
unrelated to limiting the construction of federal power. But, as 
the writings of James Madison make clear, such was not the case 
at the Founding. In a letter discussing the Ninth Amendment 
that Farber does not address, Madison explained that protecting 
rights and limiting the construction of power amount to the same 
thing. 
If a line can be drawn between the powers granted and the 
rights retained. it would seem to be the same thing, whether 
the latter be secured by declaring that they shall not be ab-
ridged, or that the former shall not be extended.42 
To Madison, limiting powers and protecting retained rights were 
two sides of the same coin: accomplishing one goal, by defini-
tion, accomplished the other. Madison's letter was written in re-
41. According to Farber: 
[N]otice the deleted language saying that enumerated rights do not indirectly 
expand other federal powers. The deletion of this language is significant be-
cause it disproves one misreading of the Ninth Amendment. which tries to twist 
it into an effort to restrict federal powers rather than to recognize unenume-
rated rights. If the idea was to restrict federal power. that language was there as 
part of Madison's draft. The fact that this specific language was deleted shows 
that the remaining language had a different purpose (p. 42). 
42. Leifer from lames Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5. 1789). in 5 THE 
DEBATE. supra note 19. at 221-22. 
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sponse to objections raised in the Virginia Assembly that the fi-
nal draft of the Ninth did not containing language clearly limit-
ing the construction of federal power. According to Madison, 
the objection was "fanciful" for language guarding retained 
rights had the same effect as language limiting the construction 
of federal power- only the language used the more powerful 
concept of rights. Advocates of a libertarian reading of the Ninth 
have_ stru.Rgled to explain (or discredit_ or ignore) this lette~ by 
Madison.· Recently, however, new evidence has come to hght 
regarding the subject of Madison's letter, objections in the Vir-
ginia assembly regarding the final draft. This new evidence 
makes clear (if the letter was not itself clear enough) that Madi-
son believed the final version of the Ninth Amendment ad-
dressed the Virginia Assembly's concerns about the need to lim-
it federal power. Hardin Burnley, a member of the assembly 
charged with debating and ratifying the Bill, shared the same 
VIeW. 
Farber insists that it is a mistake to read the Ninth as limit-
ing federal power. But not only does he ignore Madison's (and 
Burnley's) letter on the subject, he also ignores Madison's 1791 
speech against the Bank of the United States, in which Madison 
publically declares that the Ninth Amendment guards against a 
"latitude of interpretation" in matters involving federal intrusion 
upon the autonomy of the states. This speech is particularly im-
portant as signaled to the Virginia ratifying assembly the mean-
ing of the Ninth Amendment according to Virginia's congres-
sional delegate and drafter of the clause. 
THE MYTH OF THE HISTORICAL OBSCURITY OF THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT 
One of the most common assertions about the Ninth 
Amendment is that it disappeared from view following its adop-
tion until resurrected by Justices Douglas and Goldberg in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut. According to Farber, following its enact-
ment. the Ninth Amendment "faded from view" (p. 46). 
Although one of the most common assertions about the Ninth, it 
is also one of most easily, and conclusively, disproved. Else-
where. I have compiled a fairly exhaustive list of post-adoption 
cases and commentary on the Ninth Amendment.44 Without 
43. See, e.g .. Randy E. Barnett. The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says. 85 
TEX. L REV. 1. 54 (2006). 
+t See Lash. supra note 19: Kurt T. Lash. The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth 
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going into detail here, suffice to say that courts and commenta-
tors repeatedly referred to the Ninth Amendment throughout 
the first century and a half of the Constitution. Highlights in-
clude Madison's letters and speeches, the first constitutional 
treatise, St. George Tucker's View of the Constitution,~' Justice 
Story's Supreme Court opinion in Houston v. Moore, 4" and liter-
ally hundreds of state and federal judicial opinions.47 The myth 
of the "forgotten Ninth Amendment" is so easily disproven that 
its continued reference in the literature raises an issue of its own. 
What can account for this myth's durability? 
The primary reason, I believe, is the fact that almost all of 
these numerous historical references to the Ninth occur in con-
junction with discussions of the Tenth Amendment and the need 
to limit federal power. Beginning with Bennett Patterson's 1955 
"The Forgotten Ninth Amendment,"-ll< modern Ninth Amend-
ment scholars (including Farber) simply dismiss as "mistaken" 
any historical reference that links the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments.49 Given the sheer number of reference accordingly dis-
missed from consideration, this is a rather bold assumption. 
Nevertheless, if one first assumes that the Ninth and Tenth have 
nothing to do with one another, then it simply follows that any 
historical evidence to the contrary must be in error. The problem 
is with the assumption. 
Again, this is not the place to fully investigate the full his-
torical record of the Ninth Amendment. My purpose is only to 
alert readers to the existence of a number of historical docu-
ments that call into question Farber's reliance on Ninth 
Amendment mythology. Farber could have addressed this 
record and no doubt advanced our understanding of a develop-
ing historical record, as indeed he has done in prior works. 50 Un-
fortunately Farber simply avoids the current debate. Although 
readers are promised a more developed historical discussion in 
the book's "Appendix" (p. 201), this final section of the book 
Amendment. 83 TEX. L REV. 597 (2005) [hereinafter Lash. Lost Jurisprudence]. 
45. St. George Tucker. Note D: View of the Constitution of the United States. in 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES 140 (Dennis & Co .. Inc. 1965) (1803). 
46. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) I (1820). 
47. See Lash. Lost Jurisprudence. supra note 44. 
48. BENNETT B. PATTERSON. THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT: A CALL FOR 
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS UNDER SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF 
TODAY (1955). 
49. P. 46: "When it was mentioned at all. the ninth was often erroneously lumped 
together With the tenth amendment (which preserves the ·powers retained by the 
states')''. 
50. See FARBER. LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION. supra note 39. 
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provides only a cursory sketch and dismissal of various alterna-
tive interpretations of the Ninth Amendment. 
THE LAW OF NATIONS, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE 
NINTH AMENDMENT 
In some ways, Farber is absolutely right to insist we consid-
er the Founders' view of the law of nations in determining the 
original meaning of the Ninth Amendment. 51 In particular, Far-
ber correctly identifies the work of the eighteenth century inter-
nationalist Emmerich de Vattel as influencing the Founding 
generations' understanding of the retained rights of the people. 
The earliest constitutional treatise, St. George Tucker's 1803 
View of the Constitution, cites Vattel's Le Droit des Gens ("The 
Law of Nations") throughout, especially in regard to the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments.52 But where Farber is concerned about 
retained individual rights, Vattel was most concerned with the 
retained rights of the sovereign. The distinction is critical in un-
derstanding how international law informed the meaning of the 
Ninth Amendment. 
Although most Ninth Amendment scholarship focuses on 
the issue of individual natural rights, the text of the Ninth 
Amendment is not so limited. It speaks of "other rights," not 
just other individual rights, much less individual natural rights. 
At the time of the Founding, rights came in many different 
shapes and sizes: individual and collective, natural and positive. 
Nothing in the text of the Ninth Amendment excludes any cate-
gory of right. For example, the people could retain the right to 
free expression (an individual natural right) or the collective 
right to determine municipal law (such as local piloting regula-
tions) on a local level. It takes but a moment's thought to realize 
that "the people" (whether conceived of a single national people 
or the people in the several states, or both) would have wanted 
to retain under local control all those rights, whether individual 
and collective, which were not delegated into the hands of the 
national government. Madison was clear about this: In his 
speech against the Bank of the United States, Madison claimed 
that because chartering a bank was not within the delegated 
powers of Congress, passing the Bank Bill would violate the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The Bill would not violate indi-
51. Justices who ··Jook[] beyond our national borders to seek the parameters of li-
bertv ... honor the framers' intent .. (p. 10). 
S2. See, e.g .. Tucker. supra note 45. at 151. 
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vidual natural rights (there was no right of people in the states to 
prevent state chartered banks-indeed, most states had them). 
Instead, the Bill would violate what Madison saw as a retained 
right of the collective people in the several states. 
In this way, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments preserved 
the Founding vision of popular sovereignty. A concept rooted in 
the English Bill of Rights, but which evolved significantly in Re-
volutionary America, popular sovereignty maintains that sove-
reign power resides in the collective people and not in their gov-
ernment. Locating sovereignty in extra-governmental 
conventions of the people was a key development along the road 
to the American embrace of written and enforceable constitu-
tions. Prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution, of 
course, the people existed in separate sovereign states (the "free 
and independent states" of the Declaration of Independence). 
One of the major issues which arose during the ratification de-
bates involved whether the people in the states would continue 
in their independent sovereign capacity, or whether they would 
be consolidated into a single national "people." In order to se-
cure ratification, the Federalists assured the conventions that no 
such consolidation would occur. As Madison assured the ratifi-
ers in the Federalist Papers, the Constitution was neither wholly 
national nor wholly federal- each would have its independent 
and respective powers, jurisdictions, and rights following ratifica-
tion. 
The problem for those still on the fence regarding the pro-
posed Constitution, however, was the possibility that delegated 
federal power would be so broadly construed as to render the 
independent sovereignty of the people in the states no more 
than a paper declaration. Once again, Federalists such as James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson insisted that 
the federal government would have only expressly delegated 
powers, and that these powers would be strictly construed. As 
Hamilton pointed out, strict construction of delegated sovereign 
power was the established "law of nations." 
According to Vattel, the acknowledged expert on interna-
tional law, sovereigns (be they Kings or a sovereign people) 
were assumed to never delegate away any more of their sove-
reign powers than was necessary to accomplish a particular pur-
pose. Accordingly, delegated sovereign authority was read to in-
clude only those powers expressly enumerated or "clearly" 
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incident to the express delegation.'3 In the first constitutional 
treatise, St. George Tucker applied Vattel's law of nations to the 
specific issue of delegated federal power. A passionate defender 
of popular sovereignty, Tucker insisted that because the sove-
reign people in the several states had previously delegated broad 
powers to their state governments, establishing a new federal 
government required the people to recall some of these powers 
and delegate them into the hands of the national government. 
Citing Vattel, Tucker insisted that all such newly delegated pow-
er must be strictly construed, and that this principle of the law of 
nations had been constitutionally enshrined through the adop-
tion of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. John Overton, a 
member of the second North Carolina Ratifying Convention 
that ratified the Ninth Amendment, similarly viewed the Ninth 
as working alongside the Tenth to preserve the retained state 
right of ''self-preservation." Writing as a judge on the Tennessee 
bench, Overton declared: 
[N)ations as well as individuals are tenacious of the rights of 
self-preservation, of which, as applied to sovereign States, the 
right of soil or eminent domain is one. Constitutions. treaties, 
or laws, in derogation of these rights are to be construed 
strictly. Vattel is of this opinion, and, what is more satisfactory, 
the Federalist, and the American author of the Notes to 
Blackstone's Commentaries, two of the most eminent writers 
on jurisprudence, are of the same opinion [Here Judge Over-
ton cites Vattel, Tucker's discussion of the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, as well as the amendments themselves].'~ 
James Madison shared the same view-the people in the states 
had been promised strict construction of federal power-a 
promise made express in the final two amendments in the Bill of 
Rights. The above does not mean that Farber (and others) are 
wrong to insist the Ninth protects individual natural rights. To 
the contrary, it is clear that the state conventions (and Founders 
like Madison) were very much concerned about protecting such 
rights. The issue involves how such rights were to be protected, 
as well as other rights which also were considered among the re-
tained rights of the people. For example. the Free Speech Clause 
53. In other works. Farber seems aware of this aspect of Vattel's writing. See 
FARBER. LiNCOLN'S CONSTITUTION. supra note 39. at 33. 
54. Glasgow's Lessee v. Smith. 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 144. 166 (1799) (Overton. J.) (cit-
ing .. vat. B. 2 c. 17. §§ 305. 308; Amendment to Con. U.S. arts 11, 12: 1 T. Bl. app. to part 
1. 307. 308: lb. 412: Vat. B. 1, c., § 10: 2 Dall. 384; 1 T. Bl. app. to part 1. 269; 4 Johns. 
163 .. ). 
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of the first amendment protected what Madison referred to as an 
individual natural right. This right was protected, however, by 
leaving regulation of speech to the people in the individual 
states. Thus, when the national government passed the Sedition 
Law, Madison objected that the law violated both the First and 
Tenth Amendments." The same was true of the retained rights 
of the Ninth Amendment: these rights, be they individual or col-
lective, were retained under the control of the people in the sev-
eral states who could then leave the matter under the control of 
their state government, or retain the right from their state gov-
ernment as well by placing the matter in their state declaration 
of rights. The Ninth and Tenth Amendment ensured these re-
tained rights of local self-government by limiting the federal 
government to delegated power (the Tenth Amendment) and 
requiring the strict construction of those powers which were de-
legated. 
When Farber sees Founding-era references to retained 
rights and the law of nations, he reads these phrases through the 
lens of modern libertarian human rights law. For Vattel and 
those Founders who applied his work to the new Constitution, 
the emphasis was on the law of nations- how sovereignties re-
late to one another and the proper construction of delegated 
power. In fact, because Vattel's work powerfully supported strict 
construction of the Constitution, later nationalists like Joseph 
Story went out of their way to denounce reliance on "Euro-
peans" like Vattel. Ironically, it was nationalists like Story and 
John Marshall who supplied the vision of national power that 
would ultimately be used to justify the New Deal Court's expan-
sion of federal authority- a result that Farber appears to ap-
plaud. But these same nineteenth century nationalists rejected 
reliance on international law precisely because the law of nations 
called for a narrow construction of federal power. One can em-
brace broad theories of federal power, or one can embrace Vat-
tel's contributions to the American theory of the people's re-
tained rights. One cannot, however, embrace them both. Thus. 
when Farber argues in favor of both New Deal regulatory power 
and enforcement of international human rights law against the 
states,56 he has doubly departed from the original vision of the 
Ninth Amendment. 
55. See James Madison. Virginia Resolutions Agains1 1he Alien and Sedi1ion ACis 
( 1798). in WRITINGS. supra note 19. at 59~91. 
56. See p. 209 (criticizing the libertarian view as unduly encroaching on federal 
power), and pp. 96-97 (arguing against economic rights as fundamental rights). 
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Farber's history of the Ninth Amendment. of course, is only 
half of his book. The second half is devoted to exploring how 
courts can go about identifying and enforcing the fundamental 
individual rights Farber believes are protected under the Ninth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Here Farber eschews any particu-
lar "global theory'' of constitutional rights and instead advocates 
the kind of pragmatic form of judicial review that he has pre-
sented in previous works. Embracing an approach that seems at 
once descriptive (this is what courts have always done) and hesi-
tantly normative (we are wise to follow the general views of the 
Founders), Farber presents a series of factors that he believes 
can both guide and constrain judicial enforcement of fundamen-
tal rights. But Farber never clearly provides a normative reason 
for embracing his pragmatic approach, and those who follow the 
tenets of originalism have good reason to reject his international-
ist reading of the Ninth. 
CONCLUSION 
Much has happened since the Founding. The Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments introduced new liberta-
rian rights. significantly altering the original balance of federal 
and state power, while at the same time establishing a new vision 
of American freedom. An originalist committed to the norma-
tive theory of popular sovereignty must reconcile these (and 
other) exercises of the people's sovereign will. If the retained 
rights of the people under the Ninth Amendment involved only 
fundamental individual rights. then it would be possible that the 
Fourteenth Amendment applied this same set of rights against 
the states. However, we know that the retained rights of the 
Ninth Amendment included all matters not left to federal con-
trol. Unless one interprets the Fourteenth as having nationalized 
every aspect of local municipal law and state responsibilities, 
there remain aspects of the original Ninth Amendment which 
are left to the control of people in the several states as a matter 
of right. Originalists are therefore left with the task of determin-
ing the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment nationalized 
certain freedoms which. prior to 1868, had remained under local 
control as a matter of right.'7 
57. A common move bv libertarian Ninth Amendment scholars has been to posit a 
broad set of libertarian righis protected by the Ninth and then claim that the seemingly 
similar text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects the same set of rights. This move allows one to skip over what remain exceedingly 
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Nor are the results of such an inquiry necessarily "'conserva-
tive" or "liberal.·· We may find that although the First Amend-
ment was considered a "privilege or immunity," the non-
establishment of religion was not. Perhaps parental rights were 
considered fundamentaL perhaps also property and contract 
rights. Perhaps not. The point is that a commitment to original-
ism is a commitment to following the trail of evidence wherever 
it leads. In this regard, Daniel Farber is surely right to upbraid 
any proponent of original understanding who refuses to apply 
the theory when it appears to lead in an uncomfortable direc-
tion. But Farber's book also stands as a warning to those who 
would use originalism as a form of political jujitsu. The move 
may work well enough for the moment, but there remains the 
on-going possibility that new historical discoveries will reveal 
that one's opponents were more right than they knew. 
difficult questions about the original meaning and ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In the end. however. this is like using frog DNA to fill in missing portions 
of dinosaur DNA. In both situations. the project has good intentions but the outcomes 
are less than ideal. See MICHAEL CRICHTO:-J. JURASSIC PARK ( 1991 ). If one's reading of 
the original Ninth is in error. so too will be one's reading of the Fourteenth. 
